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Abstract
Gender gaps in income and level of position in the workplace are widespread. One
explanation for this inequality is that the genders perform di⁄erently under competi-
tive conditions, as previous experimental studies have found a signi￿cant gender gap in
competitive tasks that are perceived to favor men. In this paper, we use a verbal task
that is perceived to favor women and ￿nd no gender di⁄erence under competition per
se. We also reject the hypothesis that a ￿stereotype threat￿explains the inability of
women to improve performance under competition. We propose an alternative expla-
nation for gender inequality: namely, that women and men respond di⁄erently to time
pressure. With reduced time pressure, competition in verbal tasks greatly increases the
performance of women, such that women signi￿cantly outperform men. This e⁄ect
appears largely due to the fact that extra time in a competition improves the quality
of women￿ s work, leading them to make fewer mistakes. On the other hand, men use
this extra time to increase the quantity of work, which results in a greater number of
mistakes.
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11 Introduction
The study of gender di⁄erences in performance has a long history in the ￿eld of economics.
Despite a recent policy push toward the equalization of men and women in the workplace
and in society, considerable inequality persists, especially in high pro￿le jobs. The possi-
ble explanations put forth in the literature can be sorted into three categories. The ￿rst
explanation relies on gender di⁄erences in skills and preferences that lead to occupational
self-selection (Polachek 1981; Macpherson and Hirsch 1995). The second explanation points
to discrimination in the workplace which results in di⁄erential treatment of men and women
of identical abilities and preferences (Black and Strahan 2001). The ￿nal and most recent
class of explanations for the gender gap rests on the experimental evidence that women may
be less e⁄ective than men in certain competitive environments (Gneezy, Niederle, and Rusti-
chini 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). In this study, we would like to explore the latter
explanation further and ask whether the nature of the competitive task at hand in￿ uences
the outcome.
Society generally perceives men to be better than women at following directions and
reading maps, while women supposedly tend to follow landmarks when driving (Bhattacharya
2005). When it comes to solving mazes, men are found to be overwhelmingly superior to
women (Pease and Pease 2000, p. 107). Similarly, men are perceived to have higher math
abilities relative to women, while women are perceived to have superior verbal skills. In
particular, Pajares and Valiante (2001) note that di⁄erences in achievement of middle school
students lie in the stereotyped beliefs about gender di⁄erences rather than gender itself. Girls
report stronger motivation and con￿dence in writing and receive higher grades in language
arts. Boys report stronger performance-approach goals (Pajares and Valiante 2001).
Previous experimental studies on gender di⁄erences under competition have focused pri-
marily on tasks that are typically perceived to be better suited for men (Gneezy, Niederle,
and Rustichini 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). In fact, these studies cite the so-called
￿stereotype threat￿as a possible explanation for why women tend to ￿shy away from com-
petition￿in their experiments. The idea of a stereotype threat ￿rst appeared in the ￿eld of
psychology. It describes the fear that certain behavior would con￿rm an existing stereotype
of a group with which one identi￿es (Steele and Aronson 1995; Spencer, Steele, and Quinn
1999). Presumably, competition against men can bring out this stereotype threat in women,
hindering their performance in historically male-dominated tasks.
Both Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) and Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) moti-
vate their experimental research by the fact that gender gaps in income and social position
are widespread. Bertrand and Hallock (2001) document this fact by gathering data on the
￿ve highest-paid executives of a large group of U.S. ￿rms over the period of 1992￿ 1997,
where they ￿nd that only 2.5 percent of the executives in the sample are women.1 Several
authors have argued that this inequality is due to the innate inability of women to compete
(see Baron-Cohen (2003), Lawrence (2006), and the citations in Barres (2006)). Gneezy,
Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) and Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) argue that, in math-
1A similar underrepresentation of women is found among CEOs at Fortune 500 companies
(http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/womenceos), tenured faculty at leading research
institutions (MIT 1999), and or top surgeons in New York City according to New York magazine
(http://nymag.com/bestdoctors/).
2ematical tasks, women fail to compete against men, but not against other women. The
authors claim that these results help explain gender inequality in the labor force. However,
this conclusion deserves further thought, because the workplace is a complex environment.
During the competition to reach the top in almost all spheres of business and politics, one￿ s
success is rarely measured solely based on performance in mathematical tasks that end in a
matter of minutes. Women and men compete also on the basis of verbal and communication
abilities, which are not associated with a stereotype threat against women. On the contrary,
the aforementioned studies suggest that, in verbal tasks, the stereotype threat might actually
negatively a⁄ect men, not women.
This study uses a verbal task in a competitive environment in order to shed light on
the following two hypotheses. The ￿rst hypothesis is that competition hinders women￿ s
performance relative to the performance of men in any environment. In order to test this
hypothesis, we run a controlled experiment where groups of men and women solve ￿Word-in-
a-Word￿puzzles. In the benchmark treatment, the subjects are paid according to their own
performance in the task. Each group member is paid per valid word found within a larger
word over a period of several minutes. We do not ￿nd statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences
between men and women in this treatment.
To study the e⁄ects of competition, we use a tournament, where only the participant with
the highest score is paid proportionally to his or her output. In contrast to previous studies
which use tasks that stereotypically favor men, we ￿nd no signi￿cant gender di⁄erences
in performance with the competitive payment scheme, which leads us to reject the ￿rst
hypothesis.
The rejection of the ￿rst hypothesis leads us to consider the second hypothesis: gender
di⁄erences stem not from competition per se, but rather from the e⁄ect of stereotype threat
made salient in a competitive setting. In other words, stereotype threat has a symmetric
e⁄ect on both genders. If the second hypothesis holds, just as women￿ s performance su⁄ers
relative to men￿ s when the competitive task is of a mathematical nature, symmetrically, men￿ s
performance should also su⁄er relative to women￿ s when the competitive task is verbal. This
can be explained by a rational inclination for the stereotyped-against group to compete less
due to the presence of seemingly superior competitors (this stereotype-threat explanation is
proposed, for example, by Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 2003).
We observe that neither women nor men increase their performance in competition with
verbal tasks. First, it seems that competition a⁄ects men in a manner that is consistent with
the second hypothesis: they compete more in tasks that stereotypically favor men (math,
mazes, etc.) and not in tasks that stereotypically favor women (verbal tasks). However,
a true test of the hypothesis involves comparing the performance of men under piece-rate
and under tournament in a single-sex environment which eliminates any potential e⁄ect of
stereotype threat. We ￿nd that competition does not improve the performance of men in a
single-sex environment, which implies that the second hypothesis can be rejected.
There is another potential reason for women not outperforming men in a tournament,
even with tasks that favor them. Note that in all previous experiments, including those
described in this paper so far, men and women have been solving various tasks under intense
time pressure. Deadlines in the workplace, though typically strict, allow the workers an
opportunity to think deeply about their decisions. Time constraints are rarely as pressing
as they appear in previous laboratory experiments on the topic. At the same time, recent
3evidence by Paserman (2008) leads us to believe that pressure has a larger detrimental e⁄ect
on women￿ s performance under competition as compared to men￿ s performance.
In order to shed light on the impact of time pressure in competitive verbal tasks, we
run the piece-rate and tournament treatments giving the subjects ample time to ￿nd as
many words as they possibly can within a larger word. We also now provide them with an
opportunity to give up before the time runs out, which allows us to test whether men and
women have di⁄erent attitudes regarding e⁄ort in these tasks.
Under this scenario, we ￿nd that extra time does not create a large di⁄erence between
male and female performance in the piece rate condition. However, extended time in a
competitive environment greatly increases the performance of women ￿so much so that they
signi￿cantly outperform the men. A large portion of women￿ s improvement over the men
comes from the quality of output they produce. Women seem to use the extra time to ensure
that their words are correct, which results in a smaller relative number of mistakes. On
the other hand, men tend to enter more invalid words, which results in a higher frequency
of mistakes. In addition, men also give up slightly more than women in the competitive
round. This evidence is consistent with the literature in evolutionary biology that suggests
that men, as ￿hunters,￿tend to have lower attention spans. On the other hand, women, as
￿gatherers,￿tend to pay attention to detail and can stay focused on a singular task for a
prolonged period of time. For example, men often ￿ ick through TV channels and do not
have the patience to watch commercials, while women are not as averse to sitting through the
boring breaks (Sullivan 2001, Pease and Pease 2000). Similarly, our ￿ndings are consistent
with the notion that higher levels of the hormone testosterone in men are associated with a
lower attention span (Sullivan 2001). This study therefore supports the research that ￿shows
that we are more products of our biology than the victims of social stereotypes￿(Pease and
Pease 2000).
Related Literature. Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) test whether men and women
di⁄er in their propensity to perform in competitive environments using an experiment where
groups of three men and three women perform the task of solving computerized mazes. In
the piece-rate treatment, men and women do not di⁄er signi￿cantly in terms of performance.
Under competition, men signi￿cantly outperform the women, which leads to a large gender
gap in performance. This gap disappears in a single-sex environment: women￿ s scores
increase signi￿cantly in a tournament against other women. This ￿nding is supported by a
recent ￿eld study conducted by Gneezy, Leonard, and List (2008), who compare the e⁄ects
of competition on gender performance in two distinct societies: a patriarchal society and
a matrilineal society. Men compete at about twice the rate as the women in the former,
while the opposite is true in the latter.2 Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) obtain similar results
as Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003), when they analyze the performance of young
boys and girls in a race over a short distance. Note that, just as with reading maps or
following directions, men can be perceived to be more skilled at solving mazes or running.
The benchmark treatment shows that this perception is most likely false. However, in a
competitive setting, the social perceptions become more salient, which may inhibit female
performance.
2Note that Gneezy, Leonard, and List (2008) use a task of tossing a ball into a bucket placed 3 meters
away from the subject, which is a task that is likely to be perceived as better-suited for men.
4Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) conduct a laboratory experiment where men and women
add up ￿ve two-digit numbers with and without competition. Although there are no gender
di⁄erences in performance under either of these compensation schemes, there is a substantial
gender di⁄erence when participants subsequently choose the scheme they want to apply to
their next performance. Twice as many men as women choose the tournament over the piece
rate. This gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance either before
or after the entry decision. However, as in the previous experiment, the task of adding up
numbers, though very simple, is of mathematical nature and therefore perceived to be biased
toward men. Again, the piece-rate treatment demonstrates the falsehood of this perception,
since there is no di⁄erence in performance between men and women. On the other hand,
the tournament treatment forces subjects to think more in terms of social norms and points
out the idea that women are not supposed to be good at math.
Field data has also been used to provide evidence for a gender gap in performance in
competitive settings. Paserman (2008) uses data from nine tennis Grand Slam tournaments
played between 2005 and 2007 to assess whether men and women respond di⁄erently to
competitive pressure in a setting with large monetary rewards. The author￿ s detailed point-
by-point analysis reveals that, relative to men, women are substantially more likely to make
unforced errors at crucial junctures of the match.
In all of the above studies, di⁄erences in performance between men and women may
be explained by the salience of stereotype threat brought about by competition. The
importance of non-gender stereotype threat for performance is documented in the broader
literature. For example, Ho⁄ and Pandey (2004) conduct a series of ￿eld experiments
where low-caste male junior high school student volunteers in rural India performed the
task of solving mazes under economic incentives. The authors ￿nd no caste di⁄erences in
performance when caste is not publicly revealed, but making caste salient created a large and
robust caste gap. Furthermore, when the link between performance and payo⁄ was purely
mechanical, the caste gap disappeared.
This paper is the ￿rst to document the e⁄ects of competition in a non-mathematical task
on gender performance and to show that stereotype threat is not the predominant reason for
gender di⁄erences. In addition, this paper demonstrates that competition does not hinder
women￿ s performance per se. In fact, women outperform men in a tournament when time
pressure is reduced. Another contribution of this study is the ￿nding that, in a low-pressure
tournament, women bene￿t from an increase in both the quality and the quantity of their
work. On the other hand, men￿ s quality of work su⁄ers due to an increase the quantity of
output.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design,
procedures, and treatments. Section 3 presents the results of the data analysis. Section 4
concludes and discusses potential future research in this area.
2 Overview of the Experiment
In order to gauge the e⁄ects of di⁄erent payment schemes on performance of men and
women, we keep with the pervious literature and conduct a laboratory experiment in which
the subjects solve a real verbal task.
52.1 The Task
The subjects were told in the instructions that their objective in this experiment was to work
on a series of Word-in-a-Word puzzles.3 In particular, in each round, subjects would have
three or ￿fteen minutes (depending on the treatment) to ￿nd as many sub-words that can
be formed out of the letters of a big word as possible. In order to control for the level of
di¢ culty across the various treatments within the same experiment, we picked puzzles that
contain a similar number of sub-words and that have a similar maximum possible score. At
the beginning of the experiment, each participant was given three minutes to solve a practice
Word-in-a-Word puzzle in order to get familiar with the task.
The following are the general rules for all the puzzles.
￿ The sub-words must be 4-letters long or longer.
￿ Acceptable characters are the letters A-Z only. Any other symbol like a number or
another symbol is automatically discarded.
￿ Proper nouns are not allowed.
￿ Plurals are allowed.
￿ Each letter in the puzzle word can only be used once within each new sub-word.
The following are the scoring rules for all the puzzles.
￿ Valid words add (N ￿3) points to the score, where N is the total number of letters in
the word.
￿ Invalid words subtract (N ￿3) points from the score, where N is the total number of
letters in the word.
￿ If the word is a duplicate, no points are subtracted and no points are added.
￿ If the word is too short, 1 point is subtracted from the total score (regardless of whether
the word is 1, 2, or 3 letters long).
The time (three minutes in part 1 and ￿fteen minutes in part 2) ran out automatically.
In the ￿rst part of the experiment, the subjects did not have the option of ￿nishing the task
earlier than three minutes. Once the time ran out, the subjects were presented with their
score (in points) and the maximum possible score in a given puzzle. Since the program
3For a complete set of instructions, see Appendix A. The puzzles were computerized using the program-
ming language Python and were based on the games provided by the website www.wordplays.com.
6records the scores automatically, the subjects did not need to keep track of their winnings
from round to round.4
Finally, changing the puzzle from round to round may prove problematic if the di¢ culty
of the task varies dramatically. If the words were not similar, the results would not be
directly comparable across treatments.5 Our main strategy is to carefully choose puzzles
with the number of correct sub-words and the maximum number of points that is as similar
as possible in all the treatments. In particular, the range for the number of sub-words is
77-85, and the range for the maximum possible number of points is 132-137. We also check
how di¢ cult it is to ￿nd the sub-words in any given puzzle. In particular, we count the
number of permutations of letters needed to arrive at any one sub-word (the complexity
factor). In particular, the average complexity factors for each of the big words (i.e., puzzles)
are 2.51 for carriageway, 2.60 for ordination, 2.39 for memorable, 2.12 for allopathy, and 2.45
for equitable. The practice word is infuscate.6
2.2 The Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Computer Lab for Experimental Research (CLER)
at Harvard Business School (HBS). All sessions were held in February-March of 2008.
The total number of individual participants was 76 people (16 groups of two men and two
women and three groups of all men).7 Most subjects were students at Harvard University
(undergraduates and graduates), although students from other Boston-area universities, such
as MIT and Boston University, also participated. Because all these institutions are highly
competitive in terms of academics, we do not expect women or men to be particularly
intimidated by competition against the opposite gender.
CLER recruits subjects via an online registration procedure. Subjects ￿rst register for
the CLER subject pool. Then, they can sign up for certain studies of their choosing. At any
point, a subject could remove him- or herself from the study if he or she is unable to attend.
When the subjects arrived at the lab, we separated them into groups of four. Even though
gender was not emphasized at any point during the study and explicit communication was
4Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) leave it to the subjects to record the number of correctly solved
mazes, because they use the internet for the experiment. Although the authors claim to have been monitoring
the subjects, in order to ensure that they did not lie about their performance, it is possible that some of them
were left unwatched at some points during the task. If men tend to lie and overestimate their performance
more in the tournament than in the piece-rate treatment, then this would potentially distort the results.
That is the reason for why we did not use online word puzzles for this experiment, but rather programmed
our own version of the game.
5This problem does not arise to the same extent in studies that use mathematical tasks. For example,
Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) simply restrict their pool of mazes to a certain level of di¢ culty.
Because every word is di⁄erent, it is di¢ cult to ￿nd truly identical tasks.
6Since the practice round is never used for any of the analysis, we choose an easier word (with 183
sub-words and 342 maximum number of points).
7We do not use the data generated by two subjects. One of the subjects (a woman) closed the puzzle
program by accident and had to redo the task, which may have increased performance arti￿cially. Another
subject￿ s data for the competition round are missing since they were mistakenly erased when the results were
compiled for ￿nal payment.
7not allowed, the subjects were encouraged to look around to see the composition of their
group.
Upon entering the lab, the subjects were ￿rst asked to read through and sign informed
consent forms for non-biomedical research.8 Paper copies of the instructions9 were distrib-
uted to the participants prior to the beginning of the experiment. In the instructions, the
subjects could answer several control questions in order to familiarize themselves with the
payment schemes and the experimental procedures. All questions were answered in private
by the experimenter. At the end of the experiment, each participant ￿lled out a brief ques-
tionnaire.10 The questionnaire asked the subjects some standard demographic questions
and inquired about their strategies and beliefs throughout the experiment. At the very end,
each subject was paid in cash a show-up fee equal to 10 US $ and his or her earnings over
the course of the session. Final income of each subject was ￿rst given in points and then
converted to US $ at the di⁄erent rates according to the payment scheme detailed below.
Average income (including the show-up fee) was $17.84 across all groups and maximum
income (including the show-up fee) was $46.05. The approximate average duration of the
sessions was 1 hour 10 minutes.
2.3 High Time Pressure Treatments
Our ￿rst goal is to establish whether men and women exhibit di⁄erent levels of performance
under competition in verbal tasks. As a benchmark measure of performance in these tasks,
we use a non-competitive piece-rate payment scheme. To test whether there is a gender-
speci￿c e⁄ect of competition on performance, we introduce a competitive treatment in the
following round. Note that the expected payo⁄ in this competitive treatment is set to be
identical to the expected payo⁄ in the noncompetitive treatment.11 However, payment is
now uncertain. In order to disentangle the e⁄ects of competition and uncertainty on gender
di⁄erences in performance, we also conduct a ￿random winner￿treatment. In this treatment,
payment is uncertain, yet independent of the performance of others.
2.3.1 Piece Rate Treatment
In this benchmark (non-competitive) treatment, the subjects have three minutes to solve
one word puzzle (puzzle word: carriageway). Each subject receives 10 cents for every point
earned in this round. No winner is announced, and everyone earns income according to one￿ s
own performance.
2.3.2 Competitive Treatment
Once again, each subject is presented one word puzzle (puzzle word: ordination). However,
the scoring is now di⁄erent. The total score in this round is compared to the scores of the
8Copies of the informed consent forms are available upon request.
9Full copies of the instructions can be found in Appendix A. After each round, the subjects were reminded
about the payo⁄ scheme in the subsequent round.
10A copy of the questionnaire is available in Appendix A.
11The expected payo⁄ is equal to 1
4(Y1+Y2+Y3+Y4), where Y is the number of points of each group
member i.
8other three members in the group. The person with the highest score (￿the winner￿ ) in
this round then receives 40 cents for every point earned. The other three members of the
group receive 0 points. In case of a tie, the winner is determined randomly out of the top
performers.
2.3.3 Random Winner Treatment
In this treatment, subjects also solve one word puzzle (puzzle word: memorable). As in the
previous treatment, there is only one ￿winner.￿However, ￿the winner￿is chosen at random
out of the 4 people in the group. This person receives 40 cents for every point earned. The
other three members of the group receive 0 points.
2.4 Reduced Time Pressure Treatments
The second goal of this experiment is to understand the impact of time constraints on male
and female performance with and without competition. For this purpose, we run a second
experiment that closely resembles the above design, but di⁄ers from it along one dimension.
In particular, the subjects now have ample amounts of time (￿ve times the length of time in
the previous experiment) to try to ￿nd as many sub-words within the larger word as possible.
We now also give the subjects the opportunity to ￿nish each treatment before the period of
￿fteen minutes allotted for each round elapses.
We conduct two treatments in this reduced time-pressure environment: noncompetitive
(puzzle word: allopathy) and competitive (puzzle word: equitable). Because the design of
these treatments is otherwise identical to that of the high-time-pressure treatments above,
we can conduct parallel comparisons within the two piece-rate and the two tournament
scenarios, as well as compare between the piece-rate and the tournament schemes under the
lowered time constraint.
Table I summarizes the various treatments for this experiment.
Table I.
Treatment Summary.







3.1 Variables and Summary Statistics
In our analysis, the main dependent variable is score measured as the total number of points
accumulated in any round.12
The main explanatory variables are dummy variables, gender, with 1 denoting a female
subject, and competition, with 1 denoting a tournament payment scheme. We also include
standard demographic control variables in our regressions. In particular, we control for
age, whether the subject is a native English language speaker (with 1 denoting a non-native
speaker), and whether the subject￿ s ￿eld of study is broadly categorized into a mathematical
concentration or a humanities-related concentration (with 1 denoting humanities). Finally,
during the experiment we attempt to gauge whether the subjects￿con￿dence changes across
the di⁄erent treatments. We measure gender con￿dence by asking each subject to report
his or her belief about who would be better in these tasks on average, men or women (1
denotes the perception that women are better at the verbal task).
Table II provides descriptive statistics for all the experiments. First, note that women,
achieve a slightly higher average score (16.9) than men (15.7) in the verbal task even in
the piece-rate treatments (although the di⁄erence in those treatments is not statistically
signi￿cant).
Second, competition seems to have very di⁄erent e⁄ects in low-time-pressure and high-
time-pressure environments. Average performance of both men and women is enhanced by
competition in the former (for men, the score increases from 14.8 in the piece-rate to 20.7
in the tournament, and for women, the score increases from 16.2 in the piece-rate to 27.5 in
the tournament, on average). In a high-time-pressure treatment, on the other hand, average
performance of both genders drops when competition is introduced (men￿ s scores decline
from 15.7 in the piece-rate to 13.2 in the tournament, and women￿ s scores decline from 16.9
to 13.8 in the tournament, on average).
Third, the gender con￿dence variable con￿rms the ￿ndings of previous studies that sug-
gest that women are stereotyped to be better at verbal tasks than men: 81.9% of male
subjects and 90% of female subjects report that they think that women would be, on aver-
age, better than men in these puzzles. Thus, it is fair to say, that in our experiment there
is a stereotype threat against men, rather than against women. Note that the piece-rate
treatments below suggest that the perception that women are better at verbal tasks than
men is likely false.
12Note that we could also create an adjusted score variable by dividing the score by the maximum possible
number of points or by the total number of sub-words in the puzzle. However, because we have already
chosen the puzzle words to have the closest possible number of subwords, all the results using the score and




Men Women Total Only
Mean Score in Piece-Rate (High Time Pressure) 15:7 16:9 16:3 17.8
Mean Score in Competition (High Time Pressure) 13:2 13:8 13:5 14.2
Mean Score in Random Winner (High Time Pressure) 15:3 15:7 15:5 16.5
Mean Score in Piece-Rate (Low Time Pressure) 14:8 16:2 15:5 17.6
Mean Score in Competition (Low Time Pressure) 20:7 27:5 24:0 23.7
Max Score in Piece-Rate (High Time Pressure) 28 34 34 30
Max Score in Competition (High Time Pressure) 24 29 29 25
Max Score in Piece Rate (Low Time Pressure) 30 30 30 29
Max Score in Competition (Low Time Pressure) 36 42 42 32
Max Score in Random Winner (High Time Pressure) 31 35 35 32
Mean Time Spent in Piece-Rate (Low Time Pressure, Secs) 839 792 815 773
Mean Time Spent in Competition (Low Time Pressure, Secs) 741 862 801 860
Mean Age (Years) 22:3 21:0 21:7 21.5
Gender Con￿dence (% think own gender is better at task) 28:1 90:0 ￿ 36.4
Percent Studying Humanities (%) 30 32 31 33
Percent Native English Speakers (%) 87:1 90:0 88:5 66.7
Number of Subjects 32 30 62 12
3.2 Performance in High Time Pressure Environment
Figure 1 and Figure 2 present the number of points (score) achieved by men and women in
the piece rate and in the tournament treatments, respectively. The height of the bars in both
￿gures corresponds to the share of male and female participants, respectively, who achieved
the score in a given range.
11Figure 1: Score Under Piece Rate in High Time Pressure Environment
Figure 2: Score Under Competition in High Time Pressure Environment
The side-by-side comparison of the distributions of scores under piece rate and under
mixed tournament (the competitive environment) leads to two observations. First, women
and men do not appear to di⁄er in performance within the two treatments. Second, both
genders seem to do slightly worse in the competitive environment. In order to test the ￿rst
observation, we follow the previous literature and perform the two-sided Mann-Whitney U
test, which compares distributions. The p-value of the Mann-Whitney test is 0.3476 in the
12piece-rate condition and 0.5723 in the tournament condition, which implies that there are no
statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences in performance between men and women in either case.
Furthermore, in this high-pressure environment, competition seems to reduce the perfor-
mance of men (with the p-value of the Mann-Whitney test of 0.073) as well as the performance
of women (with the p-value of the Mann-Whitney test of 0.047).
Note that the tournament scheme di⁄ers from the piece rate condition in two ways: the
payment depends on the performance of others and it is uncertain. For example, Dohmen
and Falk (2006) attribute part of the gender di⁄erence in preferences for the competitive
environment to di⁄erences in the degree of risk aversion. We therefore need to check that
the results are truly driven by the e⁄ects of competition rather than risk aversion. In order
to introduce uncertainty without competition, we run another treatment, where once again
only one group member is paid, but that person is chosen at random. The results are similar
in the random-winner treatment condition, where the p-value of the Mann-Whitney test is
0.7892.
We conclude that, unlike in mathematical tasks, in verbal tasks there is no signi￿cant
di⁄erence between men and women when competition is involved. Competition does not
boost performance of men. This allows us to reject the ￿rst hypothesis: competition alone
does not seem to be the driving force behind gender di⁄erences in performance.
Next, we consider the second hypothesis proposed in the introduction: namely that the
feelings of stereotype threat create gender di⁄erences under competition. Note that the
above results for men could to be in line with the stereotype threat explanation: a man
knows that in competition he is facing one person drawn from the same skill distribution
as himself and two people who have higher verbal ability. Therefore, a man has a lower
expectation of winning the tournament, which may hinder his performance. However, this
reasoning would suggest that women should perform better under competition in verbal
tasks, which we do not ￿nd. In order to resolve the question of the role of stereotype threat
under competition, we compare the piece-rate and competition scores of men in a single-sex
environment. We ￿nd that men do not perform signi￿cantly better relative to piece-rate
when competing only against other men (the p-value of the Mann-Whitney test is 0.148).13
Therefore, we can reject the second hypothesis that stereotype threat is a major cause of
gender di⁄erences in a competitive environment. Figure 3 provides a visual summary of the
results. It shows that men and women do not perform di⁄erently in any of the treatments,
and that men in a single-sex environment also do not perform signi￿cantly better than men
(or women) in the mixed tournament.
13Note that so far we only have data for three single-sex groups. In the future, we plan to collect more
data in this treatment in order to increase robustness of results.
13Figure 3: Average Score in the High-Time-Pressure Treatments
3.3 Performance in Low Time Pressure Environment
One potential reason behind women￿ s lack of improvement in performance under competition
can be competition itself: women never compete.14 But another explanation is that time
constraints and pressure a⁄ect men and women di⁄erently. In order to shed light on the
latter question, we conduct an extended-time treatment, keeping the di¢ culty of the tasks
and all other factors the same. In this low-time-pressure environment, we have two rounds:
one with a piece-rate payment scheme and one with a tournament payment scheme. Figure
4 presents average scores of men and women for all the treatments in the experiment.
14We know from previous studies (Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 2003) that women do not always
shy away from competition. For example, women do perform better when facing only other women in a
tournament.
14Figure 4: Average Score for All Treatments
(Con￿dence Intervals at the 90% Con￿dence Level)
Figure 5 and Figure 6 present the number of points (score) achieved by men and women
under low time pressure in the piece rate and in the tournament treatment, respectively.
Figure 5: Score Under Piece Rate in Low Time Pressure Environment
15Figure 6: Score Under Competition in Low Time Pressure Environment
Comparing the distributions of scores for women and men in Figure 5 and Figure 6, we
note that the availability of extra time signi￿cantly changes the outcomes. First, we observe
that extra time increases the performance in the competitive round for both, men and
women. Comparing the piece-rate treatment to the tournament, men increase performance
with the p-value of the Mann-Whitney test of 0.0422 which is statistically signi￿cant at
the 5 percent con￿dence level. The women increase performance with the p-value of the
Mann-Whitney test of 0.0001 which is statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent con￿dence
level. Second, we ￿nd that competition with extended time boosts female performance
beyond the performance of men. In order to test whether the apparent gender di⁄erence
under competition is statistically signi￿cant, we again perform the Mann-Whitney U Test in
both treatments. The p-value of the Mann-Whitney test is 0.673 in the piece-rate condition
which implies that there is no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence between the scores of men
and women here. However, the p-value is 0.043 in the low-pressure tournament condition:
women perform signi￿cantly better than men in this competitive environment. 15
3.4 Women and Men: Quality vs. Quantity
In this section we look deeper into the mixed-group data in order to shed light on the origins of
the di⁄erential performance of men and women in extended-time competitive environments.
15Note that it is possible that some of the positive e⁄ect of competition on both genders stems from the
usage of a di⁄erent puzzle word in the two treatments. However, ￿rst of all, according to the complexity
factor, the tournament word is actually slightly more di¢ cult than the piece-rate word. Secondly, the e⁄ect
of competition and reduced time pressure is strong enough in magnitude to dominate any of these word
e⁄ects. In future work, we plan to test this hypothesis by switching the order of the words in piece-rate and
competition rounds.
Most importantly, the signi￿cant gender gap that we ￿nd here arises independently of word choice and
order, since all subjects face the same puzzle in a particular round.
16In particular, we focus on a measure of mistakes in various treatment conditions. This
measure is simply the number of points lost due to entering invalid words.
First, we compare mistakes made under piece-rate and tournament in the high pressure
environment. The Mann-Whitney U Test p-values of 0.5474 and 0.4292 in piece-rate and
competition, respectively, suggest that the numbers of mistakes made by women and men
do not di⁄er signi￿cantly in either treatment when time pressure is relatively high. With
reduced time pressure, the p-value in the piece rate condition is 0.9653, which once again
implies that men and women make the same number of mistakes. However, in the low-time-
pressure tournament, the p-value is 0.0275, which means that, at the 5 percent con￿dence
level, we can reject the null hypothesis that men and women make the same number of
mistakes.
Figure 7 documents the average number of mistakes made by men and women in all
treatments.
Figure 7: Average Mistakes (in terms of Points) for All Treatments
(Con￿dence Intervals at the 90% Con￿dence Level)
In the low pressure environment, competition slightly reduces the number of mistakes
made by women from the average of 5.2 points to 4.7 points. However, the important factor
contributing to the men falling behind the women in this treatment condition is that reduced
time pressure increases the number of mistakes made by men signi￿cantly from the average
of 3.8 points in the piece-rate condition to the average of 9.3 points in the tournament. This
is an average increase of 5.5 points, which is a large e⁄ect, given that the mean number
17of points earned by men in the entire experiment is approximately 16 points. (The Mann-
Whitney U Test rejects the null hypothesis that men do not make more mistakes signi￿cantly
at the 1 percent con￿dence level with a p-value of 0.0084.)
The results suggest that while women might see the increase in time they can spend on
the task as a way to increase the quality of their words, men seem to view the extended time
only as a way to come up with more words. Table III documents the ratio of points lost
due to invalid words (the quality measure) to the total number of points that the subject
could have achieved if all the words were valid (the quantity measure). In the reduced-time-
pressure tournament, men￿ s percentage of mistake points out of all possible points is almost
double that of women (30.6 percent vs. 16.2 percent).
Table III.
The Percentage of ￿Mistake￿Points Relative to the Total Possible
Points Across Treatments (Quality-to-Quantity Ratio, %).
Men Women
High Time Pressure Piece-Rate 6:1 10:1
High Time Pressure Tournament 12:5 12:1
Low Time Pressure Piece-Rate 19:5 28:0
Low Time Pressure Piece-Rate 30:6 16:2
On average, in the reduced time-pressure environment, men can potentially achieve a
slightly higher score than women (30.2 vs. 29.2) because they enter more words. Unfortu-
nately for men, this increase in quantity seems to greatly reduce quality which results in an
overall reduced performance.
Recall also that in the part of the experiment with reduced time pressure, the subjects
are able to withdraw from the game at any point during the round by clicking a ￿￿nish￿
button. The instructions clearly explained to the participants that they may click this
button after they had come up with all the sub-words they possibly can. Looking back at
the descriptive statistics (Table II), we note that women tend to spend more time (give up
less) in the competitive round than in the piece-rate. The opposite is true for men: they
seem to give up more in the competitive round. The e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant at the
13% con￿dence level for women, according to the Mann-Whitney U Test and may also add
to the explanation of the gender di⁄erence between men and women.
4 Conclusion
This paper uses controlled experiments to address two major issues in the literature regarding
gender di⁄erences. First, we explore further a hypothesis put forth in previous studies that
men outperform women in all competitive environments. Previous studies used tasks of
mathematical nature, which are stereotyped to be better suited for men. In this paper, we
use verbal tasks, which are typically thought to favor women. We ￿nd no gender di⁄erences
in performance in either non-competitive or competitive payment conditions. Neither gender
shows improvement in performance when the payment scheme changes from piece-rate to
tournament. These ￿ndings lead to a rejection of the ￿rst hypothesis.
18Second, we test the hypothesis that stereotype threat a⁄ects both men and women in a
symmetric fashion, favoring the gender for which the task is perceived to be most well-suited.
Our study ￿nds that with verbal tasks, men do not improve performance in a single-sex
tournament relative to men in a mixed tournament. This evidence implies a rejection of the
second hypothesis.
Next, we propose an alternative explanation for the lack of a positive e⁄ect of compe-
tition on women. This explanation relies on the di⁄erential e⁄ect of time pressure on the
performance of men and women. Our main ￿nding is that women perform signi￿cantly bet-
ter than men in competitive verbal tasks once the time constraint is relaxed. An important
factor contributing to this gender di⁄erence is that men and women respond di⁄erently to
reduced time pressure. While women seem to use the extra time to increase the quality of
their work (e⁄ectively reducing the number of mistakes), men use the time to increase the
quantity, producing a higher volume of work, but also increasing the share of mistakes.
We conclude that competition is not the cause of the gender gap in performance per se.
Its e⁄ect depends greatly on the type of the task at hand. In the workplace, women and men
face competition not only in terms of their ability to perform jobs of mathematical nature,
but also in terms of their verbal abilities, such as writing reports, creating presentations, and
talking to clients. According to previous studies, competition favors men in the former. We
￿nd that, in the latter, competition favors women, at least when they are given ample time
to complete the task. Using a more creative task in this study, such as word puzzles, also
allows us to show that women tend to do a more thorough job than men when given the
opportunity. For example, with a task like solving mazes, quantity is all that matters, since
an incorrectly solved maze is not penalized. With a verbal task, on the other hand, quality
matters as well, which is what eventually separates women from men in competition.
The evidence documented in this paper suggests that gender inequality may be explained
by the inherent di⁄erences in the responses of men and women to time pressure, rather than
by societal conditioning, such as stereotype threat. This result implies that policies seeking
to alleviate gender gaps in the workforce may want to subsidize a work culture that promotes
a more relaxed atmosphere and lowered time pressure.
The results so far suggest several directions for future research. In addition to the two
hypotheses proposed and tested in this paper, we consider a third hypothesis that stems
from the rejection of the ￿rst two. In particular, the hypothesis claims that stereotype
threat only a⁄ects women and not men in a competitive setting. Note that we observe that
competition in verbal tasks does not seem to help women. Previous studies (for example,
see Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003)) suggest that women may do worse relative
to men in competition precisely because they expect men to have superior mathematical
abilities. If men were a⁄ected by stereotype threat in our study, then the ￿nding that
women do not improve performance under competition would lead to a rejection of the
third hypothesis. However, in our study, stereotype threat does not have an e⁄ect on men,
and therefore, we cannot test the third hypothesis with available data. In other words,
we cannot distinguish that women do not do better under competition because they are
a⁄ected by male presence even in verbal tasks or because they do not change their behavior
for strategic reasons, anticipating that stereotype threat would not have an e⁄ect on men.
However, the extended-time experimental framework provides an opportunity for testing this
third hypothesis in the future. The new treatment that would provide such a test is one
19where men and women perform tasks of a mathematical nature in a reduced-time-pressure
environment. Comparing performance of men and women in the piece-rate and tournament
conditions in this treatment would allow for a direct comparison of the responses of men and
women to stereotype threat.
Another important robustness check that has yet to be conducted involves running more
sessions of the experiment and changing the order of the competitive and the non-competitive
treatments. This is necessary because we are interested in within-subject comparison and
therefore keep the same subjects from piece-rate to competition. Reversing the order of the
treatments will eliminate potential order e⁄ects.
So far, we have documented that women￿ s performance is higher than men￿ s in the
extended-time competitive environment with a verbal task, which allows us a direct compar-
ison to some of the previous literature￿ s results. However, previous literature has established
another important result, namely, that women choose to enter into competitions with male-
oriented tasks much less than men (Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)). In order to provide a
parallel using a verbal task, we propose to run sessions where men and women are asked to
self-select into one of the two types of environments: non-competitive and competitive. We
hypothesize that women will self-select more than men into the competitive verbal task only
when there is reduced time pressure.
Finally, extra single-sex sessions are also required in order to add data to our currently
small sample.
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225 Appendix A: Experimental Documents
Instructions for the experiment (Part 1)
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment which involves solving word
puzzles. Please read the following instructions very carefully. You will receive all the infor-
mation you require for participation in the experiment. If you follow these instructions, you
will have an opportunity to earn real money that will be paid to you, privately and in cash,
at the end. If you do not understand something, please raise your hand and wait for the
experimenter to come to your place and answer your question privately.
Communication between participants is absolutely forbidden during the ex-
periment! Not obeying this rule will lead to immediate exclusion from the experiment and
all payments.
Groups:
Throughout the experiment, you will be a member of a group of 4 people (two men
and two women). The other three members of your group are sitting in the same row of
desks as you.
Puzzles:
You will be solving Word-in-a-Word puzzles. You will have 3 minutes to ￿nd as many
smaller sub-words that can be formed out of the letters of the big word as you possibly can.
Everyone will be working on the same puzzle at the same time.
General rules:
￿ The words must be 4-letters long or longer
￿ Acceptable characters are letters A-Z only. Any other symbol like a number or another
symbol will be automatically discarded
￿ Proper nouns are not allowed
￿ Plurals are allowed
￿ Each letter in the word can only be used once
Scoring rules:
￿ Valid words add (N ￿3) points to your score, where N is the total number of letters
in the word
￿ Invalid words subtract (N ￿3) points from your score, where N is the total number of
letters in the word
23￿ If the word is a duplicate, no points are subtracted, no points are added
￿ If the word is too short, 1 point is subtracted from the total score (regardless of whether
the word is 1, 2, or 3 letters long)
Example: Big word PERSUASIVELY. You enter: persuasive (+7), live (+1), live (0),
lyve (-1), lyver (-2), sap (-1), as (-1). The total number of points is 3.
Rounds and Payment:
The ￿rst part of the experiment consists of 4 rounds. In each round, you will have a
chance to work on a di⁄erent word puzzle. You will have 3 minutes to work on each puzzle
(3 minutes per puzzle).
Round 1: In this round, you will be given 3 minutes to solve one word puzzle for
practice. This puzzle will not add or subtract from your total score.
Round 2: In this round, you will be asked to solve one word puzzle. Each of you will
receive 10 cents for every point you earn in this round.
Round 3: In this round, you will again solve one word puzzle. However, the scoring will
be di⁄erent. Your total score in this round will be compared to the scores of the other three
members in your group. The person with the highest score (￿the winner￿ ) in this round will
receive 40 cents for every point earned. The other three members of the group will receive
0 points. Note that, in case of a tie, the winner will be determined randomly out of the two
top performers.
Round 4: In this round, you will also solve one word puzzle. As in Round 3, there will
only be one ￿winner￿in this round. However, ￿the winner￿will be chosen at random out of
the 4 people in the group and will receive 40 cents for every point earned. The other three
members of the group will receive 0 points.
Exact Procedure
At the beginning of the experiment, you will receive an ID number. For example, members
of the same group might receive ID numbers A1, A2, A3, and A4. Members of another group
might receive ID numbers B1, B2, B3, and B4.
On the ￿rst screen you see, you will enter your ID number. Next, you will click ￿Submit.￿
To start the ￿rst round, press ￿Start￿on the screen that follows.
On the next screen, you will be presented with the practice puzzle (Round 1). Remember
that you will have 3 minutes to come up with as many valid words as you can. After typing
in your sub-words, you can either press the ￿Enter￿key on the keyboard or click ￿Submit.￿
24Make sure you check the spelling of your sub-words carefully, since you will NOT be able to
go back and edit them once they have been submitted.
The time will run out automatically. Once it does, you will see your score (the number of
points you earned in this practice round) and the total possible number of points you could
have earned in this puzzle. Please, click ￿OK￿to proceed.
25Please, be patient. You might need to wait 30 seconds to 2 minutes in between rounds!
Clicking ￿OK￿will bring you to an information screen. Please, click the button labeled
with ￿Proceed to next Round,￿at which point the second round will start. The procedures
for Rounds 2, 3, and 4 are identical to the procedure in Round 1.
You will receive your payment at the end of the experiment. Payment calculation for
Part 1:
Your income from Round 1 [= $0]
+ Your income from Round 2
+ Your income from Round 3
+ Your income from Round 4
= Total income for Part 1
Control Questions
261. You are in Round 2. Your big word is CREATIVITY. You ￿nd words Reactivity, Race,
Rat, Creative, and Crate.
(a) Your score in points is points. (Answer: 4 Points)
(b) Your income made on this word puzzle is $ (or cents)
2. You are in Round 3. Your score is 30 points. The other members of your group scored
14 points, 25 points, and 29 points.
(a) Your income made on this word puzzle is $ (or cents)
(b) The income of the person with the score of 25 points is $ (or
cents)
3. You are in Round 3. Your score is 30 points. The other members of your group scored
14 points, 25 points, and 30 points.
(a) Your income is $ (or cents) with probability of 1
2 and $
(or cents) with probability of 1
2.
(b) The income of the person with the score of 25 points is $ (or
cents)
4. You are in Round 4. Your score is 30 points. The other members of your group scored
14 points, 25 points, and 39 points.
(a) Your income is $ (or cents) with probability of 1
4 and $
(or cents) with probability of 3
4.
27Instructions for the experiment (Part 2)
The second part of this experiment is identical to the ￿rst part with the exception that
you will now have 15 minutes to solve each word puzzle. At any point during the 15 minutes,
you will be able to ￿nish the round by clicking the button labeled ￿Finish.￿Please, DO
NOT CLICK ￿Finish￿until you are absolutely sure that you cannot come up with any
more words.
Rounds and Payment:
Round 1: In this round, you will be asked to solve a word puzzle. You should have as
much time as you need to come up with as many words as you can (up to 15 minutes). Each
of you will receive 5 cents for every point you earn in this round.
Round 2: In this round, you will again get a new word puzzle, and you will again have
as much time as you need to come up with as many words as you can (up to 15 minutes).
However, the scoring will be di⁄erent. Your total score in this round will be compared to the
scores of the other three members in your group. The person with the highest score (￿the
winner￿ ) in this round will receive 20 cents for every point earned. The other three members
of the group will receive 0 points. Note that, in case of a tie, the winner will be determined
randomly out of the two top performers.
Exact Procedure
The exact procedure is identical to the procedure described in the instructions for Part
1. The payment calculation for Part 2:
+ Your income from Round 1
+ Your income from Round 2
= Total income for Part 2
Total Income in the Experiment
Show-up fee [= $10]
+ Total income for Part 1
+ Total income for 2
= Total income in the Experiment
28Questionnaire
We ask you now to ￿ll out a brief questionnaire. Please, answer as honestly and com-
pletely, as you possibly can, since your answers will help us tremendously!
1. What is your ID number (i.e. A1, B3, etc.)?
2. What is your gender?
3. What is your age?
4. Are you a native English speaker (i.e., is English your ￿rst language)?
5. Are you currently a student?
And if yes, what is your ￿eld of study?
6. In your opinion, who would be better in these tasks on average, men or women (circle
one)?
Men Women
7. How did changing the rules from non-competitive to competition change your e⁄ort
and performance in the puzzles? Why?
8. Circle one answer:
Competition: a. helped me. b. hurt me
I tried more in: a. non-competitive rounds b. competitive rounds
I gave up: a. never b. more in non-competitive rounds
c. more in competitive rounds d. in both type of rounds
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY!!!
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